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DE GRUYTER
OPEN
DE
G
Th is article is an empirically based theoretical contribution to the investigation of meaning-
making in the ecology of human interaction and interactivity. It presents an ecological 
perspective on meaning-making that pivots on how agents pick up information directly in
their organism-environment-system; i.e. as an activity that does not presuppose inner cognitive
operations. We pursue this line of thought by presenting an analysis of how a doctor and 
a nurse make a decision about a specifi c medical procedure (catheterisation) based on 
meaning-making activity. As we do not see meaning as a linguistic (symbolic) or a cognitive 
(representational) phenomenon external to an agent/user, but as emergent in coordinated 
interaction, we zoom in on how the practitioners recalibrate the organism-environment-
system by shift ing between a multi-agentive mode and an individual mode. We use Cognitive
Event Analysis to investigate how the agents oscillate between being a multi-agent-system 
with shared, tightly coordinated agency and a loosely coupled dialogical system where 
the individuals bring forth an understanding based on their professional backgrounds and 
expertise. On this view, an ecological approach to meaning-making takes a starting point 
in how local interaction is constrained by previous events, emergent aff ordances in the 
environment, and real-time inter-bodily dynamics. Accordingly, meaning-making is seen 
as a joint activity emerging from the system’s coordinative actions rather than as a result 
of individual interpretation of symbolic content.
Key words: meaning-making, Cognitive Event Analysis, ecological psychology, dialogical 
systems, decision-making, interactivity, distributed cognition, human coordination
Introduction
In recent years, classic theories of language as an inventory of form-meaning 
pairs have been disputed (Cowley, 2011; Kravchenko, 2007; Love, 2007). While 
Brought to you by | University Library of Southern Denmark - Syddansk Universitetsbibliotek
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/30/17 10:44 AM
155MEANING EMERGENCE IN THE ECOLOGY OF DIALOGICAL SYSTEMS
the rejection of classic code-based views may entail a plethora of alternative 
views, recent theorising tends to converge on the ecological view that language is
a tool for behavioural and social coordination (Fusaroli & Tylén, 2012;
Rączaszek-Leonardi & Cowley, 2012; Tylén, Weed, Wallentin, Roepstorff , & 
Frith, 2010). Th e challenge for such views, evidently, is that the rejection of 
form-meaning pairs is asymmetric: what one discards is the fi xed relation
between form and meaning, but as behavioural and social coordination is 
deduced from observable behaviour, form (e.g. in the shape of vocal activity) 
survives the post-(post)structural purgatory and resurrects in recent ecological and
distributed frameworks. Where does this asymmetry leave the concept of  “meaning” ?
In Ecological Psychology (Gibson, 1979), “meaning” is seen as direct, i.e. as
unmediated by inner cognitive processes in the animal: the animal picks up 
relevant information in the environment, not as stimuli for perception, but as 
possibilities for actions. Being relative to a particular animal’s needs and abilities 
for interacting with the environment, Gibson (1979:127) termed these possibilities 
aff ordances: “Th e aff ordances of the environment are what it off ers the animal, 
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.” 
If we accept the Gibsonian view, meaning is constituted by the relation 
between the animal and the environment. But this view is not fully in line with
recent ecological approaches to language, as they trace meaning to social
coordination between human beings (as the relevant animal in question).
Narrowing in on human beings as the relevant locus of inquiry, meaning is at 
the same time traced to human-environment relations and to human-human 
coordination. How do these two viewpoints align? A partial answer is found 
in recent developments in ecological approaches to social psychology (Marsh, 
Johnston, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009), but
as observed by Linell (2013, 2015) these approaches leave the agents in a
theoretical interstice: Th ey are both seen as being parts of each other’s environment
and as co-constituting an agentive whole (e.g., a distributed cognitive system 
(Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000)) Th e fi rst of these two poles represents a view 
where the two human agents engage in wilful action: encountering the other 
gives the agent the possibility to greet, talk, smile, etc., and as such the agents 
are aff ordances for each other’s behaviour. On the second pole, the individuality 
of the agents is transcended as their bodies calibrate to the presence of the other: 
their postural sway changes (Fowler, Richardson, Marsh, & Shockley, 2008), their 
heart rate changes (Konvalinka et al., 2011), and their metabolic processes change 
(e.g. if they lubricate or salivate). In general, the presence of the other is known 
to alter a person’s perception (Richardson, Marsh, & Baron, 2007), so that the 
dyad’s joint aff ordances are irreducible to the sum of their individual aff ordances.
Th ese considerations imply that the dynamics of a human “organism-
-environment-system” (Järvilehto, 1998, 2009), are not logically bipolar but tripolar.
Th e terms “logical bipolarity” and “logical tripolarity” refer to the logical positions
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an entity can have in an organism-environment-system: on a bipolar view, it 
can either be (part of) the organism or (part of) the environment. On a tripolar 
view, the organism and the environment are supplemented by a third pole, that 
of a multi-agent system that is irreducible to the agent and the environment. 
Th e agent-environment dyad thus becomes an agent-system-environment triad. 
On this view, human beings can be part of each other’s environment, they can 
co-constitute a multi-agent system within an environment, or they can oscillate 
between these two positions (cf. Figure 1). We favour the third position because 
human agents are living systems, and living systems are dynamic (Van Orden,
Holden, & Turvey, 2003; Van Orden, Kloos, & Wallot, 2011). If the agents oscillate
between these two positions, the totality of the system oscillates between two 
states: In one state, the two agents constitute a multi-agent system that is in a
state of coordination, which prompts the agents to co-orient to their joint
environment. In the other state the two agents orient to each other as parts of 
each their environment. In the fi rst state, their meaning-making is invested in 
the environment, whereas it is directed towards each other in the second state. 
Given that organism-environment systems are multiscalar, these two logical 
positions can co-exist: A1 and A2 can synchronously coordinate and co-orient; 
they can fl uctuate between coordinating and being coordinated.1 
1 Th is understanding of multi-agent systems resembles the theoretical models of “participatory
sense-making” (Cuff ari, Di Paolo, & De Jaegher, 2015; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007), “distributed
cognitive systems” (Hollan et al., 2000), “transient extended cognitive systems” (Wilson & Clark, 2009),
and “dialogical systems” (Steff ensen, 2012). Space limitations prevent us from an in-depth discussion of the
similarities and diff erences, but we see the present article as a contribution to the dialogical systems thinking.
Figure 1. Oscillations in a human organism-environment system. Seeing one agent (A1) as
a fi xed point allows for seeing the other (A2) as oscillating (along the arrow) between
co-constituting a multi-agent system (at the left  pole) and being part of A1’s environment
(at the right pole). Th e inter-agentive dynamics are here described as a movement on
the part of A2: the “centripetal” movement gives rise to a multi-agent system, whereas the
“centrifugal” makes the two agents orient to each other as parts of their environment
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Th ese considerations have made us hypothesise that the kind of “meaning” that
led the tradition to assume a semantic realm, can be traced to these oscillations
in tripolar dialogical systems: in the systemic mode, the system seeks to 
achieve results in a shared environment, which requires that they invest their 
coordination-induced meaning in environmental aff ordances. In contrast, the
“centrifugal” movement entails a state where the agents orient to each other
as dialogical aff ordances for meaning.  In either state, the aff ordances depend
both on the dialogical system’s history of coordination, and on the agents’
autobiographical backgrounds. 
Th is view on meaning corresponds to the intuition that led Karl Bühler (1934) 
to suggest his organon model. To Bühler, signs both connect the interlocutors
(our “multi-agent system”) and point to an external world (“the environment”).
But whereas Bühler couched his model in terms of representational signs that
function as communicative mediators between a sender and a receiver, we emphasise
that “meaning” is not a quality of independently given signs. Rather meaning 
emerges in the dynamic interplay between agents, and between these agents as
a dialogical system and their joint environment. In ecological psychology, the
epistemological interest has been invested in the understanding of meaning
in agent-environment relations, whereas social psychology has invested their
epistemological interest in agent-agent dynamics. In line with recent developments
in ecological linguistics, we insist that we need to bring these two dimensions 
of meaning together.
Interestingly, the two dimensions correspond to the two semantic traditions 
mentioned by Sidnell (2016), namely “the designative tradition” (meaning related 
to the environment) and “the expressive tradition” (meaning related to the socially 
embedded communicators). But our model transcends both of these traditions, 
as we insist that meaning is not a quality of signs, but deeply interwoven with 
the ways in which agents are embedded in an environment – that is, with their
interactivity with a term we have proposed elsewhere (Harvey, Gahrn-Andersen,
& Steff ensen, 2016; Pedersen, 2012, 2015; Steff ensen, 2013, 2015; Steff ensen,
Vallée-Tourangeau, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2016). As such, we see our ecological
research agenda as aligned with Sidnell’s when he remarks that “both these
approaches, and others as well, never ask what meaning amounts to as a practical
matt er of daily life and ordinary talk. Th at is, what does ‘meaning’ do?” (Sidnell,
2016). Likewise, we align with Sidnell’s position when he argues that such questions
can only be answered by taking an empirical approach to meaning-making,
i.e. by investigating how human beings understand a given situation through 
their coordinative and coordinated actions.   
In this article we pursue the question of what meaning does in a practical sett ing,
namely in a department of emergency medicine (Pedersen, 2015). However, our 
approach diff ers from Sidnell’s in two ways. First, whereas Sidnell (2016) asks 
“How are word meanings actually used by persons in the course of speaking to 
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one another?,” we do not see meanings as pertaining to words or other constructs 
from the linguistic tradition, and we do not see meaning as something that can be 
used, as that implies that ‘meaning’ has an externalised, independent existence 
apart from ‘the user’. Qu ite obviously, we do not intend to say that words etc. are 
“meaningless” or unrelated to meaning dynamics. Meaning emerges in dialogical 
systems, and it is irreducible to any single part of these: even if extending the 
middle fi nger upwards towards your interlocutor is routinely associated with 
an obscene symbol of disrespect, the fi nger is not the carrier of that meaning. 
Th e same goes for the production of sequences of recognisable sounds, such as 
/ˈminɪŋ/. It is not the sound sequence itself that means ‘meaning’, but within the
totality of the dialogical system, the specifi c behaviour (including the vocalisation
of /ˈminɪŋ/) gives rise to certain behavioural outcomes across the system. As 
argued by Witt genstein half a century ago, it is a fallacy to isolate the “word” 
(or the gesture) as the carrier of meaning. But on the other hand, if an observer 
takes a “language stance” (Cowley, 2011), according to which such vocalisations 
are heard as symbols, s/he can see a correlation between how the dialogical 
system changes and how vocalisations emerge in this course. In other words,
even if the observer denies that meaning pertain to words and symbols, s/he 
can still use such symbols as heuristic tools for understanding what happens in 
the dialogical system. Further, as also the participants in the dialogical system 
observe their own, and each other’s, behaviour, they too take a language stance 
that allow them to exploit the energy condensed in symbols: symbols become 
nudges capable of co-constraining and co-controlling dialogical systems, not
as structures sui generis, but as emergent behaviours within the system
(cf. Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2011). Hence, whether it is traced to behaviour, symbols
or an att ractor on a longer timescale, meaning emerges in the ecology of dialogical 
systems. In our terminology, we would say that the dialogical system becomes 
“sense-saturated” (Steff ensen, 2013).2 
Second, we are less interested in “the course of speaking to one another” per 
se, than in the ecological implications of such interactions, i.e. in how dialogical 
systems achieve results in a larger ecological environment. Th is emphasis on the
environmental implications of dialogical systems refl ects our approach to ‘meaning’
as equally invested in agent-agent interaction and in agent-environment
interactivity. On this view, meaning is irreducible to coordination between the 
interlocutors, because the purpose of interaction lies beyond interaction. To 
Rączaszek-Leonardi and colleagues (2014), the purpose of interaction is twofold: 
“to maintain the systemic character of a conversing dyad and to organize it into 
a functional synergy in the face of tasks posed for a dyadic system as a whole.” 
In general, linguists and interaction analysts have been reluctant to dive into 
the task component in dialogical systems, in part for methodological reasons, as 
2 On an evolutionary timescale, when the dynamics of a dialogical system became saturated by meaning,
the action potentials within such systems were radically transformed (Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2011).
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this component requires a cognitive/psychological theoretical frame that allows 
one to investigate how human agents engage in the environment. Two areas of 
cognitive psychology come to the fore as particularly relevant in this context: 
problem-solving psychology and decision-making psychology, as they both 
describe how subjects approach external tasks and problems. Th e scope of this 
article prevents us from an in-depth incorporation of any of these fi elds; in what 
follows we scrutinize an example where the emergence of meaning plays out in a
process that can be aptly described as joint decision-making. Th e crucial observation
made here is that our approach to ‘meaning’ involves the tripolar dynamics 
of two agents and an environment, which also goes for joint decision-making. 
‘Decision-making’ is a cognitive process during which the agent(s) identifi es 
various alternatives present in the environment and weighs these alternatives 
based on goals, values and preferences, and joint decision-making is thus the same
process where the decision process is driven by a multi-agent system. While the 
decision-making process can be investigated from a psychological point of view, 
only an approach that acknowledges meaning-making processes can grasp the 
dynamics within the dialogical system as well as the results achieved. When a 
dialogical system faces a situated need to make a decision, its only way forward 
involves the kind of dynamics that, from the ecological point of view sketched 
above, will give rise to meaning.
To pursue this line of research, we will fi rst (in section 2) present the method 
applied in this article, namely that of Cognitive Event Analysis (Steff ensen, 2013, 
2016; Pedersen & Steff ensen, 2014; Steff ensen et al., 2016; Vallée-Tourangeau, 
Steff ensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, & Makri, 2015). Second, in section 3 we apply our 
ecological framework to a single case study from a Danish emergency medical 
department. Aft er a short intermezzo (in section 4), where we relate our case to
the participants’ experience as expressed in a post hoc interview, we conclude
(in section 5) by discussing our results vis-à-vis the overall question of this special
issue: what is “meaning” in an ecological view on language?
Cognitive Event Analysis
Cognitive Event Analysis is an ecological method for investigating how
humans adapt to and modify their environment in order to move forward and get
things done (Steff ensen, 2013). Space limitations prohibit a thorough unfolding 
of the analytical method (for a detailed presentation, see Cowley & Nash, 2013; 
Pedersen, 2015; Steff ensen, 2013, 2016; Steff ensen et al., 2016; Trasmundi & Linell,
submitt ed). CEA pivots on a fi ne-grained examination of video recordings of 
human interactivity. Building on a qualitative and cognitive basis, it investigates 
how human organism-environment systems achieve results. More specifi cally, 
it scrutinises the changes and transitions in the interactivity trajectory that 
emerge around cognitive activities. With a focus on how results are achieved 
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(e.g. how problems are solved or how decisions are made), it investigates the 
relevant processes of embodied meaning making that lead to particular actions 
and outcomes in the system. Th e methodological procedure of CEA consists of 
multiple steps spanning from event identifi cation to interpretation (see Steff ensen 
et al, 2016). An important part of this procedure is the identifi cation of phase 
transitions including event pivots. Phase transitions indicate changes in the fl ow 
of interactivity, e.g. when the system oscillates between coordinated and less 
coordinated states. Such changes in the oscillation patt ern are indicative of the 
agents’ movements within the system, and they are bound up with how meaning 
contributes to the recalibration of the system. Event pivots are crucial transition 
points where changes in the dynamics of the dialogical system has a cognitive 
function vis-à-vis the task undertaken by the system. Examples include how a 
team experiences a breakthrough while working on a challenging problem, or how 
it suddenly comes to see something odd as fi tt ing the larger picture, or when it 
reaches a decision. CEA focuses on connecting such event pivots to explain how 
results are achieved in dialogical systems. In the current context, we zoom in on 
inter-bodily coordination pertaining to how meaning-making emerges in situ. 
CEA prompts the analyst to deal with multiple timescales. While the method
pays particular att ention to real-time bodily dynamics playing out in local coordination,
it links those behavioural patt erns to longer timescales beyond real-time interaction,
for instance when sociocultural timescales come to the fore as an individual’s 
skilful behaviour.
Meaning dynamics in a dialogical system:
the medical team in action
Having presented CEA, we now turn to a case study where we focus on the 
tripolar dynamics that constitutes meaning (cf. section 1). In our study, we are 
specifi cally interested in how the two agents in our example shift  from a state 
of being a coordinated medical team to a state of negotiating what to do next.
Th e example comes from ethnographic work done by Trasmundi (Pedersen, 
2015) in an emergency medical department at a hospital in the Copenhagen area 
in Denmark. In this article, we focus on a situation where a 92-years-old woman 
has been hospitalised with a proximal femur fracture (a hip fracture). At the 
hospital she is received by a medical team that consists of an experienced nurse 
and a novice doctor, who had worked at the ward for only a couple of days when 
the recordings took place. Th e asymmetry between the two practitioners leaves 
them in a precarious position: on the one hand, the role of the “doctor” entails 
certain legal and cultural obligations to take the lead,3 and on the other hand,
3 In a Danish context, these cultural expectations are sometimes referred to as doctors having a
“Tarzan syndrome”: they are expected to deal with everything themselves, and asking for help is a sign 
of weakness.
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newcomers in teams tend to take a position of “legitimate peripheral participation”
(Lave & Wenger, 1991). One would expect that this tension between two sets 
of expectations on a cultural timescale plays out in the interpersonal dynamics 
on an interactional timescale (Steff ensen & Pedersen, 2014). An overview of the 
sett ing is given in Figure 2.
As the patient has been diagnosed with a hip fracture, the treatment of the
patient will include orthopaedic surgery. However, before the patient is ready for
that, the medical team has to go through a number of pre-treatment proce-
dures, including pain alleviation and stabilisation of the patient’s other bodily
functions. Our focus is on a single procedure in the pre-treatment phase that 
relate to the latt er, namely the patient’s ability to urinate. In our case, the medical
team – in accordance with standard procedures – performs a urinary catheterisation.
Th e urinary catheterisation is a rather trivial procedure, but the decision to
perform it depends, not on rules, but on a judgment based on the mobility of 
the patient. In our case, this decision becomes an interesting cognitive event
Figure 2. Overview of the layout. In the “centripetal” state the two health practitioners are
oriented to the patient as an aff ordance for taking medical action, and in the “centrifugal”
state the two are oriented to each other in a meaning-inducing intermezzo in the medical
process. In this fi gure, the simultaneity of the two states is visible in the way that hand
gestures are oriented towards the patient, while gaze is oriented to each other
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because the team, to begin with, decides not to perform the procedure in spite of a high
number of indications that catheterisation is indeed necessary. Th e event illustrates 
how meaning in the dialogical system emerges in the interplay between sociocultural
regularities, individual expectations, knowledge about medical procedures,
perceptual pick-up of information about the patient, and situated decision-making.
From a procedural point of view, a decision to perform a urinary catheterisation
has three steps which are all saturated with meaning-making: fi rst, the team 
must identify a need (i.e., it must come to see it as a meaningful procedure to 
consider); second, they must examine a number of informed arguments pro and
con the procedure; and third, the team, or one of the participants in it, must
conclude (either through wordings or through action) that the arguments in
favour of catheterisation outweighs those against. In the vast majority of our
ethnographic material, these steps are collapsed into a single action: practitioners
“just know” that catheterisation will be needed sooner or later, and the arguments in 
favour of the procedure are so well-established that it is hardly even seen as an 
argumentation. Accordingly, the procedure is “just done.” However, in this case 
the medical team diverts from the three procedural steps; they go through the 
second step two times: the fi rst time (which is the focus of this article) they do 
not reach the conclusion that they need to insert a catheter, whereas they do so 
the second time (at a later stage in the pre-treatment procedure). As the decision 
not to perform a urinary catheterisation signifi cantly diverts from the standard 
medical procedures at the department, the question from a cognitive point of view
obviously becomes: what happened when they decided not to catheterise the patient?
In what follows we will analyse this event in fi ne-grained detail, but let us 
fi rst have a look at the app. 60 seconds in which the relevance of catheterisation 
and the decision not to catheterise play out. For a more accessible overview, we 
fi rst rely on a transcription of the episode:4
Transcript:  Duration 01:01:00 minutes
DANISH ORIGINAL
1. 34:01:10, P: jeg har s jeg har sådan en (.) ble p [å
2. 34:03:50, D:            [ja:: det har du
3. 34:04:60, P: ja
4. 34:05:00, ps (0.8)
5. 34:05:80, D: øhm 
6. 34:06:40, ps (0.7)
7. 34:07:10, N: vi skulle jo nok lægge et kateter
8. 34:08:60, ps (0.9)
9. 34:09:50, D: ska vi det? (.)
10. 34:10:20, N: eller (.) det er ikke nødvendigt måske
4 We apply the transcription system developed by Gail Jeff erson for the analysis of conversation
(Jeff erson, 2004). D is the doctor; N is the nurse; P is the patient.
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11. 34:12:30, P: (xxx)  [det det det næ det plejer jeg      [ikke
12. 34:12:60, D:            [na:rj det er da ikke nødvendigt [hvis ikke du plejer
               at bruge kateter 
13. 34:15:30, N:                                                                     [nej jeg tænker nogen
   gange med mobilisering til bækken og sådan noget men det kan
   vi jo nok godt ↓
14. 34:19:20, ps. (0.7)
15. 34:19:90, N: få et bækken ind under når du skal tisse og sådan ↑
16. 34:22:80, P: ja  [det ved jeg-
17. 34:23:10, N:      [men det virker som du er rimelig god alligevel til og lige at få
18. 34:26:40, ps: (0.8)
19. 34:27:20, P: ja bortset fra at øh den der den gør ondt
20. 34:30:30, N: ja:=
21. 34:30:70, D: =men nu lægger jeg jo FIC–blokken
22. 34:31:80, N: ja
23. 34:32:40, D: tror du tror du ikke vi klarer  [ººudenºº
24. 34:33:80, N:       [vi gør det jo tit men men men lad os 
                                                                                                       bare prøve at se
25. 34:36:60, D: ja det ved jeg ik så  [det det er jo det kan da godt være vi  [ska det
   er dig øh
26. 34:37:40, N:                                                                                         [ja 
27. 34:38:40, N:                                                                    [ja men
                                         det er jo folk der   [ik øh ka:: ka bevæge sig så godt og jeg synes
                                         egentlig hun er rigtig god
28. 34:40:20, P:                     [altså jeg har jeg har jeg har den der på gulvet
                                                med min mave
29. 34:45:20, D: med maven  [der driller den er  [lidt tynd (.) ja
30. 34:45:80, P:                      [ja                          [ja ja 
31. 34:48:20, N: lad os bare lige øh (.) nu prøver vi bare li:ge at lægge det her så
32. 34:50:80, D: e ellers det   [jeg tror det er dig de::r er me::st øh
33. 34:51:30, N:                      [ja jeg tror nemlig (0.1) ja (0.1) vi ser det lige an (0.3)
   fordi jeg synes egentlig også at øh det er realistisk og 
34. 34:57:90, D: det er jo begrænset hvor mange bækkener jeg lægger 
35. 35:00:10, P: ja
36. 35:00:70, D: eller hvad hedder det
37. 35:01:30, N: ja (smiling)
38. 35:01:70, D: så (laughs)
ENGLISH TRANSLATION
1. 34:01:10, P: I have a I have such a (.) diaper o [n
2. 34:03:50, D:                                                        [ye::s you have
3. 34:04:60, P: yes
4. 34:05:00, ps. (0.8)
5. 34:05:80, D: ehm
6. 34:06:40, ps. (0.7)
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7. 34:07:10, N: we should probably insert a catheter
8. 34:08:60, ps. (0.9)
9. 34:09:50, D: we should?  (.)
10. 34:10:20, N: or (.) that is not necessary perhaps
11. 34:12:30, P: (xxx)  [that that that no:  I do                    [not 
12. 34:12:60, D:            [no:: that should not be necessary                    [if you do not
               usually use a catheter 
13. 34:15:30, N:                                         [no I think 
   sometimes with regards to the mobilisation to the bedpan and such
    but I guess we can manage that ↓
14. 34:19:20, ps. (0.7)
15. 34:19:90, N: place a bedpan under when you need to go to the toilet and such ↑
16. 34:22:80, P: yes   [I don’t know
17. 34:23:10, N:          [but it seems like you are prett y good anyway to just get 
18. 34:26:40, ps. (0.8)
19. 34:27:20, P: yes except from ehm that this one it hurts
20. 34:30:30, N: ye:s=
21. 34:30:70, D: =but now I am going to perform the FIC block right
22. 34:31:80, N: yes
23. 34:32:40, D: don’t you don’t you think we manage   [ººwithoutºº
24. 34:33:80, N:                                                                  [we oft en do it but let us
   just try and see
25. 34:36:60, D: yes that I do not know so [it it is well it might be that we  [should
   that is you eh
26. 34:37:40, N:                                            [yes  
27. 34:38:40, N:                                                                                   [yes
                                         but that is people who are  [unable eh to move so easily and I
                                         actually think she is rather mobile 
28. 34:40:20, P:                                               [well I have I have I have this one on
                                                  the f loor
29. 34:45:20, D: with the stomach  [that is a bit tricky it is [a bit diarrhoea like (.) yes
30. 34:45:80, P:                               [yes      [yes yes 
31. 34:48:20, N: let us just eh (.) now we are ju:st trying to give this so
32. 34:50:80, D: o or this  [I think it is you who a::re the mo::st eh
33. 34:51:30, N:                 [yes because I believe (0.1) yes (0.1) we will just wait
   and see (0.3) because I actually also think that eh it is realistic and 
34. 34:57:90, D: aft er all I only place a limited number of bedpans 
35. 35:00:10, P: yes
36. 35:00:70, D: or what is it called
37. 35:01:30, N: yes (smiling)
38. 35:01:70, D: so (laughs)
By matching the procedural description of the three steps in decision process 
with the transcript we identify the following key transition points in the cognitive
trajectory: (i) the relevance of dealing with the patient’s urinary function emerges
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in line 1 (P: I have such a (.) diaper on); (ii) the initial suggestion to catheterise 
is expressed by the nurse in line 7: we should probably insert a catheter; and (iii)
the decision to rely on using a bedpan for her urination is taken in line 33 when 
the nurse says: we will just wait and see (0.3) because I actually also think that eh 
it is realistic. In the terminology of CEA, these three transition points are event
pivots: they indicate when the problem becomes relevant, when the argumentation
begins, and when a decision is reached and confi rmed. 
What makes this particular event so interesting is that the nurse’s initial judgment
will be carried out much later in the pre-treatment process, but it is overruled
in this sequence, as they reach the conclusion not to catheterise and rather rely 
on a bedpan. As this outcome is a direct result of the meaning processes in the 
dialogical system, the emergence of meaning is best investigated by zooming
in on the relevant event pivots and transition points that indicate changes in the
dialogical system’s specifi c meaning confi guration, and hence the focus on these 
transition points gives insight into the overall meaning-making trajectory. 
Investigating the cognitive  trajectory, in particular step 2 in the decision process 
(i.e. the sequence in line 7–33), thus gives us the opportunity to investigate how
the two agents create diff erent meanings (understood as organism-environment 
relations) and how they through meaning coordination reach a decision. Th us, 
based on changes in the agents’ meaning-making in relation to the task, we
segment this sequence into seven phases (see Table 1).
Table 1. Seven phases in the meaning confi guration in the dialogical system
Phase Line Meaning confi guration
I 7-12
Th e nurse suggest catheterisation
Th e doctor does not concur with catheterisation
II 13-18
Th e nurse repeats her suggestion to catheterise the patient
Th e doctor is silent
III 19-23 Th e catheterisation suggestion is related to the patient’s pain
IV 24
Th e catheterisation suggestion is related to the department’s
procedures
V 25-27
Th e doctor reconsiders catheterisation
Th e nurse argues against catheterisation
VI 31-32
Th e doctor reconsiders catheterisation
Th e nurse argues against catheterisation
VII 33 Th e nurse concludes that catheterisation is not necessary
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Th e seven phases are visualised in Figure 3 below. In what follows, the trajectory
described in Table 1 and Figure 3 will be elaborated in detail by zooming in on 
each of the seven phases.
Phase I: Making medical procedures meaningful
Th e fi rst phase concerns the nurse’s proposal to consider urinary catheterisation.
Her proposal is prompted by the patient mentioning that she is wearing a diaper 
(line 1). Th is utt erance is identifi ed as an event pivot, because it prompts the nurse 
to interrupt the procedural fl ow in the medical team by suggesting catheterisation 
as the proper solution to an anticipated problem of urination. 
In theoretical terms, the coordinated multi-agent system is perturbed, and 
the two practitioners re-orient to each other as relevant aff ordances for their 
meaning-making activities. Th is re-orientation is observable from the nurse’s gaze 
behaviour. Th us, when the nurse begins on her proposal (in line 7), she gazes at 
the patient’s body, but at the end of the utt erance, her gaze is redirected to the 
doctor. Hence, the dialogical system undergoes a centrifugal movement where 
they move from a coordinated state with joint att ention to a less-coordinated 
state where they need to achieve a shared interpretation of the situation. Th is 
process of coordination depends on a centripetal movement that gives rise to 
meaning dynamics in the situation, and from an observer’s point of view, this 
meaning is observable in their bodily orientation. Th us, the nurse makes the hip 
area of the patient’s body relevant through her gaze, and both doctor and nurse 
pay att ention to that part of their environment, which hence becomes a shared 
aff ordance for meaning and subsequent action. Th e nurse’s combination of verbal 
prompting and gaze becomes an aff ordance for restoring the multi-agent system:
the nurse makes it clear what action must be initiated, and by pointing to relevant
features in the environment, she prompts the doctor to perceive the same 
meaning. But the doctor does not follow the nurse’s lead. Aft er a pause of 0.9 
seconds (line 8), the doctor questions the suggestion explicitly: We should?
Figure 3: the emergence of meaning in decision-making. Th e arrow shows the cognitive
trajectory, the blue triangles indicate event pivots, and the white triangles indicate 
phase transitions. Th e phase transition points and event pivots segment the trajectory 
into the seven phases listed in Table 1
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(line 9). Th us, the patient’s initial utt erance becomes an aff ordance for very
diff erent action possibilities. In this way several meanings emerge: Th e nurse 
argues for catheterisation, the doctor does not concur.5 
Since the decision on whether to catheterise or not is based on how mobile
the patient is, the doctor’s utt erance we should? (line 9) indicates that catheterisation
was not part of the doctor’s pre-treatment plan, either because she does not 
share the nurse’s judgment, or because she never even thought of it as a relevant 
procedure to consider. Accordingly, the doctor’s hesitation creates a relational 
ambiguity: on the one hand, if the doctor reject’s the nurse’s judgment, the role 
hierarchy and cultural expectations dictate that the doctor has the right and 
obligation to make the fi nal decision; on the other hand, if the doctor’s reaction
is caused by the fact that she did not take a relevant procedure into consideration,
priority is normally given to the one in the best position to overview the
situation, and in this case that is the most experienced participant: the nurse.
Evidently, the ambiguity cannot be easily resolved, and hence two meanings
co-exist in an interpersonal negotiation that needs to balance both a clinical 
aspect and a cultural role aspect. 
From the nurse’s subsequent utt erance – or (.) that is not necessary perhaps
(line 10) – it is clear that she picks up on the fi rst of these two aspects: she
modulates her proposal into a question, so while she initially proposed a procedure,
she now asks the doctor whether this procedure is a good idea. While the doctor’s
contribution to the reasoning has been minimal, the sequence has prepared a 
conclusion (catheterisation is not necessary) and a line of argumentation
(a rejection of the nurse’s judgment) that the doctor is prompted to adopt. It is not 
based on an elaborate argumentation, however, but such an argument is quickly
reconstructed. To come up with an argument, the doctor uses the patient as a
cognitive resource (line 10 and 11). Th e patient is made relevant by the nurse: when she 
utt ers that catheterisation is perhaps dispensable (line 10), her gaze moves from the 
doctor to the patient. In this way, the patient becomes involved in the negotiation, and
she states that she does not usually need a catheter. Th e doctor uses this statement
and frames it as a warrant for her own opinion (line 12): no:: that should not 
be necessary if you do not usually use a catheter. As the doctor addresses the
patient with the deictic ‘you’, she changes her orientation (in gaze, in posture,
and in verbal behaviour) from the nurse to the patient, leaving the nurse as a
less signifi cant component in the system as she becomes a temporary observer 
of what is going on.
Th e information provided by the patient has a signifi cant impact on the meaning
processes in the interaction. It confi rms the doctor’s line of argumentation,
5 As pointed out by Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi (pers.comm.) this segment of our example is a powerful
illustration of the importance of social systems and sociocultural norms and regularities. Th us, the very 
fact that the patient’s initial utt erance has such a big impact on the overall trajectory is related to specifi c 
Danish norms of non-hierarchical egalitarianism and inclusion.
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and because the multi-agent dialogical system so crucial in medical teamwork 
is dissolved, the role hierarchy means that the doctor is positioned as the main 
cogniser; i.e. as the one who is going to make the decision. However, from a 
medical point of view, the patient’s information is utt erly useless: whether the 
patient needs a catheter or not, is not a question of whether the patient normally
uses one, but only a question of her present condition. Th e only relevant question
is whether her broken hip complicates or even prevents her from going to the 
toilet or using a bedpan or not.
In conclusion, including the patient as a relevant source of information in the 
decision-making process does not contribute any valuable information regarding
the clinical problem at hand. However, integrating the patient has a direct impact 
on the oscillations in the system, as it enables the doctor to dissolve the initial 
meaning ambiguity by reaching a conclusion in a way that is consistent with the 
provided, though irrelevant, information. In this way, she avoids rejecting the 
nurse’s proposal, but the price is high: she relies on irrelevant information and her
conclusion is invalid. 
Phase II: Embodiment as an aff ordance for meaning
In the cultural context of a medical department in Denmark, the doctor is 
the main responsible for patient treatment, and in the end she has the authority 
and the obligation to decide what to do. Offh  and, it seems as if a decision has 
already been reached in the previous phase: the nurse proposed a pre-treatment 
procedure, but the doctor rejected it. In our ethnographic material it is extremely
rare that such decisions are questioned, and if one reads the transcript of the second
phase, which runs from line 13-18, it shows that the nurse on two instances 
concurs with the doctor’s decision: but I guess we can manage that↓ [and] place a 
bedpan under when you need to go to the toilet and such↑ (line 13-15) and it seems 
like you are prett y good anyway to just get (line 17). But she also expresses her 
disagreement with the emerged conclusion: First, for the only time during this 
sequence, the nurse interrupts another interlocutor, namely the patient. Not 
only does she interrupt the patient, she does so while the patient is sharing her 
experiences with using a catheter (line 11), which, as we saw, is the utt erance 
that implicitly, and logically fallaciously, supported the doctor’s hesitation.
Second, the nurse expresses an outright disagreement: no (kursywą) she says in
line 13 in response to the emerged conclusion in the fi rst phase. Th ird, she
expresses a vague concern with the implications of the conclusion: I think
sometimes with regards to the mobilisation to the bedpan and such (line 13). 
Her concerns are vaguely phrased, but they are accentuated and amplifi ed by 
her embodied behaviour. Th us, the phase transition marks a change from verbal 
argumentation in Phase I to embodied performance and visualisation in Phase II.
Th is change in the trajectory comes to the fore when she anticipates the line of 
actions in case the patient needs to urinate. Th is anticipation is articulated in
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a whole-bodied narrative of how the bedpan is diffi  cult to place under an impaired
patient. She refers to her experiences from previous situations with the words 
sometimes with regards to the mobilisation (line 13), and at the same time she 
engages in an embodied visualisation of the physical constraints in placing a 
bedpan under the patient. We scrutinise the nurse’s visualisation in the following 
(cf. picture A-D in Figure 4 below).
Th e nurse performs the situation for both the doctor, whom she needs to con-
vince in order to make the right decision, and the patient, who will feel the 
consequences of the decision. As the nurse verbally refers to the process of
placing the bedpan (line 13), she performs a series of embodied movements:
she wiggles her hips and upper body from side to side while she moves her right
arm back and forth. Th e arm movements simulate the actual bodily movements
required in placing a bedpan under the patient (see Figure 4), and the simultaneous
hip wiggling illustrates the movements of the patient during the process of placing
the bedpan. In other words, in this small scenario the nurse performs the actions
of two agents: the nurse placing the bedpan and the patient moving her
(fractured) hip. Th e nurse simultaneously communicates the bodily consequences 
to the patient and the constrained working condition to the doctor. Using her
Figure 4. Decision-making in Phase II. In picture A-D, the nurse wiggles her hips and
torso from side to side as she moves her right hand back and forth. Th ese body movements
visualise the physical constraint when arranging a bedpan. Simultaneously, the nurse
utt ers: no I think sometimes with the mobilisation to the bedpan and such (line 13)
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own body as a display, she creates aff ordances for perceiving the future consequences
of a particular procedure. By so doing, she prompts the dialogical system to 
restore a joint meaning and a joint interpretation. Th is centripetal movement is 
seen in Figure 4, where the doctor fi rst gazes at the nurse’s head (picture A-B) 
but soon aft er turns her att ention to the movements that the nurse performs
(picture C-D). Such a reconfi guration in the dialogical system, where the participants
attend to each other’s embodied behaviour, gives rise to new patterns of meaning-making:
they temporarily suspend their orientation to the task and the patient in order to 
calibrate how they perceive the problem of urination and the potential solution
of catheterisation. In the overall treatment procedure, verbal symbols have
functioned as nudges that impacted on their joint orientation to the patient
(Rączaszek-Leonardi, 2011), but now meaning-making emerges from the
embodied behaviour as they orient to each other. During the narrative the doctor
carefully observes how the nurse plays out the scenario through embodied movements.
When the nurse has demonstrated the problem, she stops moving her body.
Interestingly, in immediate continuation of this dramatised intermezzo, the nurse 
contradicts her own concern by estimating that they probably can mobilise the
patient in order to place the bedpan: but I guess we can manage it ↓ (line 13) as she
nods ‘yes’ and gazes at the doctor. So while she creates the bodily aff ordances for 
the doctor to make the centripetal movement towards the nurse’s perspective, 
she engages in an opposite movement towards the perspective that the doctor
entertained in Phase I. Th is double movement leaves the doctor in a tense position:
if she picks up the embodied information and is convinced by the nurse’s
scenario, she has to ignore the nurse’s subsequent estimation – and vice versa. 
Placed in this tension, the doctor hesitates (cf. the pause of 0.7 seconds in line 14) 
as she makes a noticeably facial expression that resembles a kind of lip-pursing 
grimace response (see Figure 5). Th e doctor does not respond verbally, but she 
wrinkles her nose and pouts her lips in a remarkable way.
Figure 5. Th e doctor’s lip-pursing grimace in line 14. For purposes of clarity, we have 
removed minor jpeg compression artefacts around the lips of the subject
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While we cannot determine the meaning embedded in this grimacing, we 
can extrapolate it from her subsequent behaviour, in particular the fact that later 
in the sequence she att empts to align with the nurse’s position, arguing that 
the nurse is the most experienced of the two (line 32). If the doctor’s meaning 
trajectory changes through the seven phases, this particular moment is a viable 
candidate for the fi rst occurrence of some sort of concern pertaining to her 
initial position. If so, the embodied knowledge of the nurse turns out to be an 
important aff ordance for the doctor to change her mind. Th e nurse’s expertise 
shows in the way she manipulates the aff ordances in the environment of the 
dialogical system: She indicates what is relevant through embodied behaviour 
(gaze, movements, and wordings), and the meaning that emerges is a direct result 
of this embodied expertise. Encountering the nurse’s aff ordances for meaning-
making, the doctor freezes, as she is prompted to reconsider the consequences
of her initial decision. Since the doctor does not respond directly to her
utt erance in line 13, the nurse continues her turn by remove by explicating that 
that  in  line 13 refers to plac[ing] a bedpan under when you need to go to the toilet 
and such (line 15). As she now directs her turn to the patient, she shift s from the 
doctor-nurse we (line 13), to the patient you (line 15). 
Th e patient also picks up on the nurse’s visualisation. While she does not 
have the medical expertise to decide whether it is possible to place the bedpan
or not, the nurse’s bodily visualisation has a strong illustrative power that
enables her to imagine the situation in a tangible way beyond verbal explanations.
Obviously, to wiggle one’s hip and torso is not a preferable activity with a hip 
fracture, and the nurse’s whole-bodied meaning-making prompts the patient to 
utt er her doubt about whether this is doable or not (line 16). However, for the 
second time the nurse counters her own objections. Th is time she compares 
general cases with the patient in question: but it seems like you are prett y good 
anyway to just get (line 16). 
As we reach the end of Phase II, we see that both the doctor and the nurse 
have moved from their initial position to a position characterised by doubt and 
meaning equivocality. Both agents have formulated immediate interpretations 
of the situation, and both agents have undergone changes in their perspective, 
which results in confusion, because in the end only one decision can be made. 
Ideally, a necessary step is to align and calibrate the system so that it is able to 
act based on a shared meaning. In this case, however, the att empt to do so has 
created even more confusion and insecurity in the dialogical system. 
Phase III: Emergent changes in perspectives
Th e dialogue so far has led to a point where the nurse doubts her own suggestion,
the doctor doubts her rejection of the nurse’s suggestion, and the patient 
expresses uncertainty and insecurity. In Phase III, which covers a small excerpt 
in the transcript (line 19-23), the doctor voices her last att empt to legitimise her 
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rejection of the nurse’s suggestion. She is prompted to do so by a short exchange 
between the doctor and the patient: the patient informs the medical team that 
her hip hurts (this one it hurts, line 19), and the doctor responds that the FIC 
block will remove the pain. Her conclusion from this exchange is expressed as a
hesitant request for confi rmation: don’t you don’t you think we manage ººwithoutºº
(line 23). Th at they can manage the situation without catheterisation is thus linked
to the FIC block, but that is another fallacious conclusion: just as the fact that 
the patient does not normally use catheter does not warrant the conclusion that 
she should not be catheterised, so the fact that the patient will be anaesthetised 
does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that catheterisation is not needed. 
Given that the doctor less than three seconds later in fact expresses a concern 
with her own pre-treatment administration, her hesitancy may indicate that 
she is in a process of realising that her argument is fl awed: the relevant clinical
question is whether the patient will be suffi  ciently medicated to permit the bedpan 
placement without hurting the patient.
An experienced emergency medical practitioner, such as the nurse, knows 
that already. But insisting on bringing these considerations to the fore in the 
medical team’s meaning-making would confl ict with the doctor’s reliance on 
patient-provided information, and it would also disturb the delicate balance 
between being the experienced practitioner and being the inferior in the role 
hierarchy. As a consequence, the nurse has been silenced, and she abstains from 
explicating her opinion any further. Instead, she replies with two minimally
responsive yes (line 20 and 22) to both the patient’s and the doctor’s utt erances.
Th is dialogical behaviour where her meaning is withdrawn from the systemic 
reasoning altogether changes the interactional dynamics further. Th us, while 
the doctor’s request for confi rmation in line 23 functions as a conclusion, it also 
calls for the nurse to take a more active role in the meaning-making process.
At this point in the cognitive trajectory, the coordination in the dialogical 
system is constrained and this constraint inhibits the system in moving on.
In order to get back on track, the system needs to recalibrate and dampen its 
meaning oscillations: they must agree on what to do next. Such a decision requires 
either powerful autonomy, where a single agent overrules the other and simply 
decides what to do, or a shared meaning-making process where the dialogical 
system as a whole decides what to do.
Phase IV: Cultural dynamics in situated meaning-making
In Phase IV (line 24), these two states of individual autonomy and system
autonomy co-exist as a tension in the dialogical system. Th e phase consists
of only one utt erance, and it is defi ned as a distinct phase because the line of
argumentation changes: for the first time in the exchange, the general
procedures in the department become part of the meaning-making. Th is happens 
as the nurse refers to catheterisation as a standard procedure at the department: 
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we oft en do it (line 24). She draws on non-local resources (Steff ensen, 2015) in 
the dialogical system’s meaning-making, as the pronoun we evokes a general
team of professionals (Linell, 2009) who oft en choose to catheterise. Th is strategy
scaff olds her situated meaning-making by drawing on experience and general 
practice. Hollan et al. (2000:178) elaborate:
Culture is a process that accumulates partial solutions to frequently encountered
problems. Without this residue of previous activity, we would all have to fi nd solutions 
from scratch. We could not build on the success of others. […] Th is is tremendously 
enabling. But it is not without cost. For culture may also blind us to other ways of 
thinking, leading us to believe that certain things are impossible when in fact they 
are possible when viewed diff erently.
Th e power of culture is re-enacted, as the nurse appropriates sociocultural
voices, and as such she introduces a powerful perspective on the dialogical
system’s joint meaning-making. Aft er all, the widespread use of catheterisation
is an important perspective for a novice doctor who has no experience with this 
part of the pre-treatment. As such, the nurse makes non-local aspects of general 
practices highly relevant. 
Per se, the nurse seems to att empt to dissolve the dialogical system’s impasse 
by empowering the system by providing useful information. But the nurse’s reply 
is ambiguous: immediately aft er this prioritisation of systemic autonomy, she 
undermines the system’s joint meaning-making by downplaying the importance 
of the department’s general procedures. She does so by scaff olding the novice 
doctor’s individual autonomy in an explicit support for the doctor’s plan: but 
let us just try and see (line 24). Th e ambiguity is striking: on the one hand, the 
nurse speaks with an authority grounded in her knowledge and expertise, which 
calls for catheterisation; and on the other hand, she argues against this decision. 
Phase V: Th e doctor and the nurse swop positions
How does a sensitive dialogical partner react to such ambiguity? Th e doctor has
the nurse’s support to a pre-treatment plan that does not include catheterisation, 
but at the same time the doctor is aware that this plan goes against departmental 
procedures. Th e result is striking: in Phase V (line 25-27) the doctor and the nurse 
swop positions! Th e nurse complies with the non-catheterisation plan, arguing
from the relative mobility of the patient, and the doctor shelves her initial conviction,
explicitly picking up on the nurse’s reference to departmental procedures: it it 
is well it might be that we should that is you eh (line 25). So at the very point in 
time where the doctor accepts the nurse’s suggestion, the nurse withdraws her 
suggestion on the pretext of identifying the patient as relatively mobile, even 
though the 92-year-old patient is in a great deal of pain and complains about her 
physical condition several times (line 19 and 28). As a result, both the doctor and
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the nurse have made a meaning U-turn based on their information pick-up
and on the oscillations in the dialogical system.
Th e nurse has drawn the doctor’s att ention to social aff ordances in the
environment, and the doctor has enacted her lack of expertise. While this change
could have led to a systemic reconfi guration where they decide on a new and 
bett er pre-treatment plan, the outcome is diff erent: thus, in the next two phases, 
the doctor’s confession of her inexperience becomes an aff ordance for the nurse 
to maintain the doctor’s systemic position – and her face (Goff man, 1959).
Phase VI-VII: Functionality and dysfunctionality
in the dialogical system
During the overall event, multiple suggestions have been evaluated within 
the team, and both their meaning-making and their positioning in the dialogi-
cal system have undergone signifi cant changes. Th e result of these oscillations 
in the dialogical system is the emergence of a decision: In Phase VI (line 31-32)
the nurse concludes: let us just eh (.) now we are ju:st trying to give this so (line 31)
and shortly aft er the doctor explicitly refers to the nurse as the expert: o- or this-
I think it is you who a::re the mo::st eh (line 32). In Phase VII (line 33) the meaning-making
trajectory reads a temporary end point in the shape of a publicly stated
decision: we will just wait and see (0.3) because I actually think that eh it is realistic and.
Th is decision is the cognitive result of 42.2 seconds of reasoning. It functions 
as the primary event pivot in the sequence, as this decision defi nes the overall 
sequence as one of meaning-making and reasoning. 
From these two phases, the self-organising nature of the decision-making
process is evident: The decision is not the result of any pre-conceived
pre-treatment plans that the practitioners try to realise. Indeed, both agents in 
the system abandon their initial arguments and come to sponsor the intuitions 
of the other agent (cf. Figure 6).
Figure 6. Th e fi gure illustrates how the two agents move through a logical space 
between the decision terms: catheterisation and non-catheterisation. Th e fi gure is
not intended as a quasi-mathematical model, but rather as a heuristic illustration
of movements between the two decision terms
Th e doctor
Th e nurse
34:40:0034:30:0034:20:0034:10:00 35:00:0034:50:00
Catheterisation
Non-catheterisation
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Th is oscillation indicates that the decision is less the result of medically
informed reasoning, and more a result of how the role hierarchy and the
protection of professional face take the lead. Seen from a strictly functional 
point of view – as favoured in the tradition of Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 
1995; Perry, 2010) – the system becomes dysfunctional because it allows task
irrelevant considerations to constrain the reasoning process. Th e two practitioners
mesh their inter-bodily dynamics with experience and medical expertise, and this 
process gives rise to meaning and decisions, as well as to insecurity, confusion,
and frustration. Th e dialogical system thus has to balance medical decision-making
and interpersonal emotional processes. As can be seen from Figure 6, these 
dynamics lead to a decision that is predominantly determined by the position
that the nurse takes at the end of the sequence. In the dynamics of the dialogical
system, the nurse takes the lead and secures that a decision is made. But the 
price is high, for at the same time she puts herself in a non-expert position by 
withdrawing her experience-based proposal and deciding to do what the doctor 
initially argued.
From a purely medical point of view the decision is not based on best practice 
and expertise but on interpersonal caring and an orientation to hierarchies and 
practices for decision-making. Th e case demonstrates that in real-life situations, 
decisions are not made in a vacuum but embedded in meaningful interpersonal 
relations shaped through processes of maintaining each other’s face (Goff man, 
1959) and orienting to role hierarchies that exist between diff erent professional 
groups (Pedersen, 2010).
Epilogue: on the poverty of phenomenal reports
A few hours aft er the recordings, both the doctor and the nurse were interviewed
as part of the ethnographic project at the ward. During her interview, the doctor 
told the researcher that “the nurse was right . ” It turned out that it was not possible
to place the bedpan under the patient, and they had to insert the catheter at a 
later and more complicated stage in the pre-treatment process. Th is caused a 
delay in the treatment plan, and it harmed the patient unnecessarily. According 
to the doctor, she was wrong and the nurse was right: “as the nurse also said , ” 
she explained, catheterisation did indeed turn out to be necessary.
Evidently, the doctor did not experience the situation as shared decision-making
with equally shared responsibility for the decision that they reached: she identifi ed
herself as the main responsible for the decision. Such an approach to decision-making
is widespread in the medical world: “Errors are regarded as someone’s fault, 
caused by a lack of suffi  cient att ention or, worse, lack of caring enough to make 
sure you are correct. […]. While the proximal error leading to an accident is, in 
fact, usually a ‘human error,’ the causes of that error are oft en well beyond the 
individual’s control” (Leape, 1994:1852). 
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Th e nurse reached a similar conclusion in her post-treatment interview: the 
collaboration went well, but as it is oft en the case, the doctor had not listened 
carefully to what she, as a nurse, had to say. Th us, in the post hoc interviews, 
both the doctor and the nurse reach the same conclusion about responsibility: 
the nurse was right about the work procedure, but she was overruled by the 
doctor. However, their experience of their team performance does not match the 
actual coordination shown in the data. Initially, the doctor rejected the nurse’s 
proposal, but that changed as the nurse informed the doctor about possible future 
complications and departmental procedures. Th us, from the data we identifi ed a 
gradual change of perspective in the doctor’s meaning-making, even to the degree 
that she realises that the nurse, as the more experienced of the two, should take 
the lead: I think it is you who a::re the mo::st eh (line 32). Th e fact that they both
report a sequence of events that does not match their behaviour in situ is a powerful
testimony to the fragility of phenomenal reports: the widespread cultural
narrative of dominant doctors and inferior nurses frame their interpretation of 
the events they went through a few hours earlier.
Conclusion
What is so striking about the catheterisation case is, fi rst, that it exemplifi es 
decision-making without a singular agent making the decision, and, second, 
that it points to the importance of non-local processes in local decision-making. 
As for the fi rst of these points, if rationality was unbounded (cf. Secchi, 2011), 
a decision-making process could in principle be completely computational and 
logical. But since that is not the case, decision-making relies on meaning-making 
processes. Th e scrutiny of the example has shown that even though the two 
main cognisers are two meaning-making individuals, it is the dynamics within 
the overall dialogical system that leads to the decision not to catheterise. Th us, 
the cognitive outcome of the process is a result of how the two practitioners 
oscillate between being a multi-agent-system with shared, tightly coordinated 
agency and a loosely coupled dialogical system where the individual brings forth 
an understanding based on each their professional background and each their
expertise. Joint meaning-making thus emerges as the agents shift  between
centripetal and centrifugal dynamics in the system, e.g. by (a) pointing to relevant
aff ordances in the environment, so new meaning emerges as new information is 
picked up and made relevant for the whole system; (b) by enacting and embodying
their medical-cultural knowledge in the situation, which allows for evidence-based
meaning-making and decision-making in the dialogical system, and (c) by evaluating
the meaning that emerges in the dialogical system.
Secondly, taking an ecological perspective on the meaning-making processes, 
the example reveals how cultural dynamics aff ect local decision-making. Culture 
transcends individual reasoning, and it is constantly re-enacted as an emergent
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phenomenon. Decision-making processes are shaped by previous episodes,
so that the practitioners’ actions refl ect embodied understandings of multiple 
cultural phenomena, for instance role hierarchies, systemic norms, physical 
and procedural limitations, personal experience, and caring for human beings 
in complex situations. 
In conclusion, when one studies cognitive dynamics in dialogical systems, 
one has to take into consideration how the system is saturated by (a) the agents’ 
non-local experiences of sociocultural and institutional procedures, (b) the team’s 
compliance with non-local expectations about how decision-making is managed
(role hierarchies etc.), and (c) situated aff ordances for specifi c actions. Crucial to
a team’s general successfulness is the ability to balance procedures and interpersonal
dynamics by caring for both the persons in the dialogical system (in our case, 
patients, colleagues and oneself) and the task to be solved by the system (in our 
case, diagnosis, examination, and treatment).
In this article, we have analysed an emergent decision as interwoven
with meaning-making processes in a dialogical system. In so doing, we have suggested
that an ecological approach traces interactional meaning to the dynamics
within the dialogical system, in particular how the agents recalibrate the system 
by shift ing between a systemic mode and an individual mode. 
From a traditional linguistic point of view, this approach to meaning is
(perhaps unacceptably) radical, as it implies that human beings can engage in 
long stretches of interaction without any signifi cant meaning-making, as long as 
the dialogical system is suffi  ciently stable (and hence not being recalibrated). But 
one has to distinguish between, on the one hand, what an observer can describe 
as meaning(ful), and, on the other, what ‘meaning’ is from an ecological point 
of view. Th us, it is hardly surprising that we can describe entities as bearing 
meaning; aft er all, in literate societies we all know the practice of consulting 
a dictionary.6 On this view, it is tempting to assume that each symbol that can 
be listed in the dictionary thus has a unique meaning (or meaning potential) 
that can be used (or instantiated) in human interaction; we may even assume
that we all carry with us an inner lexicon that contains more or less the same
information as the dictionary. But at the end of the day, this point of view
depends on the assumption that human cognition is an inner machinery that gives 
us “competence” or “knowledge,” which in turn give rise to “performance” and 
“use” – and while space prevents us from rehearsing the arguments against it, it is 
simply an unacceptable assumption from the point of view of ecological cognitive 
science. But indeed one can ask – as one of our reviewers did – what is the role
of meaning in communication if ‘meaning’ is exclusively traced to recalibrations
in dialogical-cognitive systems? Th e fallacy underlying such a question is that we 
readily assume that meaning is necessarily at play whenever we engage in the
6 For instance, we can read in the Oxford English Dictionary that “meaning” means “what is meant by 
a word, text, concept, or action.”
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phenomenon called ‘language’. But considering the wide array of automatised, 
routinely performed behaviours we are capable of – peeling potatoes, mowing 
the lawn, humming Roger Whitt aker tunes – why should everyday talk be any 
diff erent? Why do we want even the most mundane verbal activities – say the 
30 minutes of chit-chat at the hairdresser – to be the result of a unique human 
capacity for meaning-making?
From an ecological point of view, the hairdresser example does indeed rely 
on meaning: As an exercise of presenting our everyday self (Goff man, 1959), we 
coordinate our behaviour with the concrete task at hand, and this coordination 
depends on such meaning-making processes as agreeing on a desired output,
sitt ing still, and engaging in small-talk, which all depend on an initial recalibration
of the dialogical system. However, once that has been achieved, the actual
utterances throughout the hairdressing procedure do not require much
meaning-making. Not unlike how bird vocalisation contributes to complex
social behaviour without symbolic meaning, human vocalisation can contribute 
to social grooming in ways where “the content” of what is actually said does not
matt er much. Meaning, on this view, is an interpretational att itude – or an enacted
interpretation – that allows us to modify organism-environment relations in ways
that do not require much eff ort. As such, meaning is a mechanism that allows us 
to mesh real-time biological agency with non-local resources (Steff ensen, 2015). 
Meaning is thus neither the content of semiotic symbols, nor a feature
of individual cognitive processes. Rather, meaning is induced when cognitive
agents recalibrate dialogical-cognitive systems, and this process can be traced
to the interplay between fast, enchronic timescale of the interaction (Enfi eld, 
2014) and slow sociocultural timescales of institutions and social systems. 
Th ese theoretical considerations also underlie the methodological approach 
pursued in this article. Methods for studying social interaction normally prioritise 
what happens in real-time, and this fi xation on one local timescale (Pedersen, 2015; 
Steff ensen and Pedersen, 2014) oft en leads to a simplistic understanding, because
it reduces the complexity of human behaviour to a few causal mechanisms.
If indeed meaning is animated by human beings in a sense-saturated ecology
(Steff ensen, 2011), we need methods that allow us to trace meaning-making 
processes to ecosystemic activity, and methods that allow us to investigate 
behavioural outcomes as shaped by both non-local dynamics and situational
aff ordances for actions within the dialogical system. In this article, we have 
presented the method of Cognitive Event Analysis as such an ecological method.
CEA focuses on how disturbances, fixations and other constraints on
action aff ect functional coordination. CEA-style investigations of the dynamical
coordination go beyond the enchronic scale of interaction, and it thus allows 
for an integration with theoretical perspectives on human cognitive, emotional, 
and linguistic capabilities for action, as well as with the moral obligations that 
prompt human beings to engage in certain behaviours rather than in others.
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However, CEA does not equip us with a comprehensive basis for answering, say,
why a patient interruption prompts practitioners to either ignore or respond
to the comment. CEA cannot explain what constitutes enabling conditions, but
it can point to them as conditions for meaning-making that leads to results.
Arguably, a method for investigating how human beings animate dialogical 
systems in order to achieve results is not only valuable for interaction analysts
and cognitive psychologists. Sociologists, anthropologists, and other social
scientists may also benefi t from methods that allow them to study the texture
of the interface between human agents and their environment.
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